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"Political ideology alone is no longer satisfactory evidence to describe 
social patterns. . . . Behind this contemporary rhetoric concerning the 
nature of reform lay patterns of political behavior which were at vari-
ance with it."1 This observation, which dates the introduction of a re-
visionist approach to the study of municipal reform in the Progressive 
period, applies with equal force to a reexamination of the initiative and 
referendum (IR) on the state level during the era of its most extensive 
use and political observer interest. Traditionally conceived of as placing 
more government in the hands of the people, in practice the IR fre-
quently became a useful tool in the hands of interest groups to further 
their own ends. IR supporters, often hamstrung by constitutional re-
strictions designed to curtail its use, occasionally found themselves on 
the defensive as their opponents came to recognize the double-edged 
potential of the device. When placed within the broad context of 
political change during the pre-World War I period, the IR emerges as 
one of several adaptations to the shifts induced by a new, mobile, urban-
industrial order. 
i 
Historically, one of the results of the colonial and Revolutionary War 
experience was the emergence of legislative supremacy over the executive 
and judicial branches of government on the state and federal levels. The 
negative experience of Americans with proprietary and royal governors 
resulted in state constitutions that curtailed executive authority, antici-
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pated a passive judiciary and provided for the legislature to be the 
active, innovative branch of government.2 
During the nineteenth century, however, there was a gradual erosion 
of the dominant nature of legislative authority. By 1850 state legisla-
tures had lost nearly all of their power to appoint magistrates, and they 
basically became simple lawmaking bodies. Furthermore, during this 
century the constitutional convention became an increasingly popular 
device to amend governmental structure and policy. The constitutional 
convention was a unicameral body elected outside of the legislature that 
not only separated the functions of lawmaking from constitution-making, 
but also began to expropriate legislative functions. These conventions 
increasingly prescribed legislative tasks, limited their authority in such 
matters as local government and finance, forbade special laws to which 
legislatures had become addicted, regulated suffrage and limited the 
length and frequency of legislative sessions. 
An expanded use of the referendum, in which the electorate shared 
in the lawmaking authority, also symbolized legislative decline. As orig-
inally incorporated into state constitutions in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, the referendum was designed to be a passive instrument, generally 
required only in amending state constitutions. During the nineteenth 
century constitutional conventions expanded the categories of compul-
sory submission to voters to include certain types of statutory issues, 
such as those involving taxation and finance. Toward the end of the 
century legislatures began using the referendum optionally, either to 
seek voter sentiment in an advisory sense, or to pass on to the voters the 
responsibility of deciding controversial questions. Voter counsel was 
particularly common on cultural issues that vexed legislatures and 
parties around the turn of the twentieth century—liquor, woman suffrage, 
Sabbatarian proposals and similar matters which called into question 
competing value systems. The Republican party in particular discreetly 
began to disassociate itself from issues that alienated the rising ethnic 
voting population.3 Both legislatures and parties preferred to sidestep 
these issues and to send them directly to the voter for decision—always 
under the rhetoric of greater democracy for "the people." 
Several other institutional alterations accompanied the decline of 
legislative authority. One change, the increasing length of state constitu-
tions, symbolized legislative impotence. The original sharp distinction 
between organic or constitutional law and laws of a more transitory na-
ture became blurred, so that state charters tended to include matters 
that in the past had been relegated strictly to the statute books. Cali-
fornia, for example, in 1879 ratified a constitution of about 22,000 
words, compared to the 4000-word United States constitution (exclusive 
of amendments).4 
Longer constitutions were in part the result of a gradual easing of the 
amending process. The legislative approval necessary was reduced from 
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two consecutive sessions to one. Furthermore, the majority needed for 
ratification at the polls was gradually lowered from a majority voting at 
the election, to a simple majority voting on the specific proposal. Since 
the mean vote on referenda generally varied between 35% and 90% of 
the vote for the leading office at that election, the possibility for minority 
legislating was augmented accordingly. 
One final thread in this fabric of institutional change was the rise of 
special-interest organizations in the late nineteenth century. These 
organizations reflected the realization that common interests took prece-
dence over the reality of common geographic location. For a number of 
reasons (including the fact that political parties at best represented the 
most common denominator of potentially antithetical interests) the par-
tisan geographic nature of representative government no longer seemed 
as responsive to the needs and wishes of various sectors of society. Ap-
plication of pressure at the state capitol by representatives of a group 
structured around a specific purpose or interest could better accomplish 
their objectives. The emergence of pressure or lobby organizations coin-
cided with the decline of the legislature as the sole active agent of gov-
ernment and with the decline of the central role of political parties. 
These factors, then—decline in legislative and partisan effectiveness 
and the rise of legal and constitutional constraints to hamper freedom of 
legislative operation—occurred at the very time that rapid changes 
brought on by the transition to an urban-industrial order placed new 
demands upon a governmental structure designed to serve a pre-indus-
trial society. In part this additional pressure was taken up by the 
judiciary, who, as a result of increased litigation, began to assume an 
active, quasi-legislative function through their decisions. Positive bene-
fits from courts as agents of change were limited, however, since judicial 
philosophy rested largely upon pre-industrial precedents. Relief became 
possible to some extent by circumventing political, judicial and legisla-
tive obstacles through such techniques as the constitutional convention, 
the expanded use of the referendum, the reliance upon special-interest 
groups, and the expansion of state constitutions to embrace statutory 
matters. The increasing role of pressure groups in particular coincided 
with the nonpartisan movement which also promoted apolitical group 
activity over party. 
Given the gradual erosion of legislative prerogatives, the addition of 
the initiative petition to the legislative process appears as a logical ex-
tension to the expanded referendum. No longer would voters be limited 
to expressions of opinion based upon constitutional concessions or legis-
lative whims. The principle that legislatures share their functions, al-
ready well established by 1900, would be broadened by permitting any 
group securing the requisite number of signatures to submit a proposal 
directly to the voters. In attaching the petition feature to the referendum, 
it became a potentially active check on the legislature by making laws 
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subject to popular veto. In a sense the IR, together with such other 
innovations of "direct democracy" as the recall of elected officials, the 
direct primary, the direct election of senators, and the short ballot, rep-
resents the culmination of pre-World War governmental adaptations to 
urban-industrial society. 
ii 
The direct legislation movement dates from the late nineteenth cen-
tury. According to a spokesman, it began as a literary movement in the 
1880s, receiving its first organizational expression in 1892 as the People's 
Power League in Newark, New Jersey. Within a year the organization 
went through several name changes and finally settled upon the Direct 
Legislation League. A monthly journal, The Direct Legislation Record, 
appeared in 1894. In that same year IR or Direct Legislation leagues 
were established in South Dakota and Kansas, and the following year in 
Michigan, Colorado and Nebraska.5 Coinciding with the culmination of 
Populism, the IR became a popular reform plank in state and national 
Populist platforms. 
Pioneers of the IR conceived of their movement as an umbrella, 
gathering beneath its cover reformers of all types: 
Many other reform movements are merging into this 
Direct Legislation movement. While the silver men, the 
fiat money man, the sound money man, the civil service re-
former, the civic reformer, the socialist, the prohibitionist, 
the single taxer, etc. may each think his own special reform 
the most important and needed, they are all beginning to 
see that they cannot even get a hearing without Direct Leg-
islation. . . . It is thus proving a real bond of union between 
heretofore warring economic beliefs.6 
A dozen years later another IR advocate echoed the same sentiments: 
"Here is a field for the activity of those who believe in the single tax, in 
prohibition, in Socialism, in populism, in anti-inrperialism and in tariff 
reform."7 
Historical examination suggests that at least three groups were par-
ticularly active in seeking adoption of the IR: single-taxers; organized 
labor; and the Grange. In some states disciples of Henry George's single-
tax philosophy were closely associated with the IR. Oregon provides the 
classic example of this connection. Faced with a recalcitrant legislature, 
W. S. U'Ren, who had become a single-tax convert in the 1890s, labored 
hard in behalf of IR as the best single means to secure that reform. His 
efforts were successful, as Oregon voters endorsed an IR amendment to 
their constitution in 1902.8 
Parallels to the Oregon experiences can be found in Ohio. As in 
Oregon, the leading IR proponent, the Reverend Herbert Bigelow, was 
also an avowed single-taxer. After a dozen fruitless years, the principle 
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thrust of Ohio's IR movement occurred at Ohio's constitutional con-
vention in 1912, which IR advocates had been partially responsible for 
calling. When the Reverend Bigelow was elected convention president 
(with the accompanying power of committee appointments) the outlook 
seemed bright for both the IR and the single tax. The IR proposal sub-
mitted to and approved by the voters, however, was quite restrictive, 
and specifically prohibited the use of the IR to secure either the single 
tax or the classification of property for taxation purposes.9 
Missouri's adoption of IR in 1908 was partly due to Henry George's 
disciples there. Three of the officers of the Missouri Referendum League, 
the chief sponsor of IR, were also officers in the St. Louis Single Tax 
League. As in other states, IR advocates realized at the outset that spon-
sorship of the IR by single-tax organizations would mean certain defeat; 
so they organized the Missouri Referendum League and thereby secured 
the support of many who were actually opposed to the single tax. Dela-
ware single-taxers were less successful; when they discovered that it 
would take an estimated six years to obtain a direct legislation amend-
ment in that state, they abandoned the project.10 
In the state of Washington, the People's Party embraced a single-
tax faction as early as 1886; and they were particularly noticeable within 
the state's urban wing of Populism in the 1890s. Their efforts on behalf 
of municipal IR laid the groundwork upon which others later capitalized 
in the eventual statewide adoption of IR in 1912.11 
Both organized labor and state Granges were also early and active 
IR proponents. Labor support for direct democracy dates from the 
1890s; leaders of both the Knights of Labor and of the American Federa-
tion of Labor endorsed the concept in what must have been one of the 
few areas of mutual agreement.12 Labor and the Grange were the most 
common components of IR organizations. Where single-taxers initiated 
the IR movement, as in Oregon, Ohio, and Missouri, they secured labor 
and (except for Missouri) farmer support. In the state of Washington, 
the state Grange assumed leadership for statewide IR at the turn of the 
century. Apparently the Grange and organized labor worked inde-
pendently until a former Grange official invited trade union represen-
tatives and others to a joint conference in 1910. Demand for IR in Ari-
zona was intertwined with the question of statehood, with mine and rail-
road employers satisfied with the advantages they enjoyed under terri-
torial status. Organized labor was active in seeking constitutional con-
vention delegates committed to IR; and they were joined by woman 
suffragists and prohibitionists. This coalition inserted IR into the state's 
initial constitution. Evidence from California suggests a broader base 
of IR support, embracing, in addition to the Arizona coalition, citizens' 
organizations and certain business and commercial groups.13 
Proponents of the IR began to achieve success around the turn of the 
century. South Dakota was the first to adopt statewide IR in 1898; by 
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TABLE 1 
Percentage Requirements Imposed by States Adopting 
Initiative and Referendum, 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 2 0 
Year 
State Ratified 
South Dakota 1898 
Utah 1900 
( implemented 1917) 
Oregon 1902 
(extended 1906) 
Nevada R = 1 9 0 4 
I Or R = 1 9 1 2 
Montana 1906 
Oklahoma 1907 
Maine 1908 
Missouri 1908 
Mich igan 1908 
(extended 1913) 
Arkansas 1910 
Colorado 1910 
Ar izona 1911 
(extended 1914) 
Cal i forn ia 1911 
New Mexico 1911 
Idaho 1912 
Nebraska 1912 
(extended 1920) 
Ohio 1912 
Washington 1912 
Mississippi 1914 
Nor th Dakota 1914 
(extended 1918) 
Mary land 1915 
Massachusetts 1918 
Initiative 
Laws 
Dir. Indir. 
5 
10 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
10 
8 
N O 
N O 
10 
7C 
10a 
(7,500) 
10 
(10 ,000 ) l 
N O 
5 
10 
(12,000) 
8 
5 
N E 
N E 
3* 
10» 
N E 
(10 + 
25,000 
+ 5,000) 
Amendments 
Dir. Indir. 
N O 
N O 
8 
N O 
15 
N O 
8 
10 
8 
8 
15 
8 
N O 
N O 
15 
N O 
10 
N O 
(7,500) 
N O 
(20,000)*» 
N O 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
E 
E 
10 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
10 + 
25,000, 
2 ses-
sions) 
Referendum 
5 
10 
5 
10 
5 
5 
(10,000) 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
10 
N O N E 
5 
5C 
6 
6* 
(6,000) 
10 
(7,000) »> 
(10,000) 
(10 + 
1 5,000; 
10 + 
10,000 for 
repeal of 
emergency 
or other 
measures) 
Limitations 
Referendum and direct 
in i t ia t ive % must 
ref lect major i ty o f 
counties 
% f rom 2 / 5 counties 
1 measures require 
major i ty of votes 
a t elect ion 
% f rom 2 / 3 Congres-
sional distr icts 
2 5 % may suspend law. 
Ma jo r i t y 4 0 % vote a t 
elect ion to reject. 
Legislature did not 
implement t i l l 1933 
5 % f rom 2 / 5 counties 
Yes v o t e = 3 5 % of 
vote a t elect ion 
1 / 2 signatures f rom 
1/2 counties 
Tota l vote must equal 
1/3 vot ing a t election 
% must ref lect 
major i ty of counties 
No t more than 1 / 2 
f rom one county or 
f rom Balt imore 
Vote must equal 3 0 % 
vot ing a t elect ion. 
Expressly inappl icable 
to numerous subjects. 
Not over 1/4 
signatures f rom 
one county. 
Parenthet ical f igures indicate provision for number of signatures rather t han percentages. 
a
 Max imum 50,000 signatures for law, 30,000 for referendum. 
b
 Parenthet ical f igures for Nor th Dakota ref lect sh i f t f rom percentages to number of signatures 
in 1918. In i t ia l percentages appear in line above. 
c
 Second row of numbers for Nebraska reflects change in percentages in 1920. In i t ia l per-
centages appear in l ine above. 
f l
 A n addi t ional 3 % necessary to refer measure to voters. 
Table adapted f rom Il l inois Legislat ive Reference Bureau, Constitutional Convention Bulletins 
(n.p., 1920) , 81 -82 ; and f rom James Pollock, The Initiative and Referendum in Michigan/ 
in Michigan Governmental Studies, Number 6 (Ann Arbor, 1940) , Appendix IV. The two 
summaries d i f fer in minor areas. 
1920 nineteen other states had followed this lead (see Table 1). Analysis 
of the IR mechanisms incorporated into the various state constitutions 
reveals almost infinite variations. Greatest uniformity appeared in the 
percentage figures required to implement IR, based upon the number of 
votes for a state officer (generally the governor) at the last preceding 
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general election. Although Table 1 shows some variation (including 
the use of an absolute number of signatures), the most common figure to 
initiate a law was 8%; to initiate a constitutional amendment the per-
centage fluctuated between eight and twenty-five. Referring a law to the 
voters for decision normally required only 5% of the previous general 
election votes. 
The initiative itself appeared in two forms. In addition to the nor-
mal initiative submitted directly to the voters, a few states enacted an 
indirect version for proposed statutes, in which the proposal was first 
submitted to the legislature. There it might be altered, amended, or 
passed in its original form. If the legislative version differed from the 
original, both were submitted to the voters. 
Referendum 
In i t ia t ive : 
— L a w s 
IR VARIATIONS A T A GLANCE 
only: New Mexico, 
only: South Dakota 
Nebraska (1920 revision) 
— D i r e c t / I n d i r e c t In i t ia t ive: 
Mary land 
, Utah, Montana, Ma ine , Washington, 
-D i rec t 1 only: South Dakota, Oregon, Montana, 
Missouri, Arkansas, 
(1914 version) 
-D i rec t and Indirect 
— L a w s : Utah, 
—Ind i r ec t 1 for 
Ohio 
Colorado, Ar izona, Nebraska 
1: 
Washington, Cal i fornia 
Oklahoma, 
Nor th Dakota 
laws, direct 1 for amendments: Mich igan, 
- Ind i rec t 1 only: Nevada, Massachusetts 
As Table 1 indicates, various restrictions were often incorporated 
into IR provisions to inhibit extensive usage. Occasionally the per-
centage figures were set sufficiently high to preclude frequent utilization, 
such as the 15% requirement for constitutional amendments in Arizona, 
Nebraska and Oklahoma. Other states demanded that signatures be 
dispersed throughout the state, and/or stipulated that the proposal re-
ceive a minimum vote. Massachusetts, for example, practically guaran-
teed limited use of the IR by a combination of a complex petition 
process, the dispersion of signatures, the determination of the size of 
the voter response, and the exemption of numerous subjects from its 
purview.14 
Most states exempted from the referendum so-called "emergency leg-
islations—acts dealing with the health, safety or welfare—which would 
be implemented immediately, rather than awaiting the usual ninety-day 
lapse to allow time for circulation of a referendum petition. Emergency 
laws had to be passed by sixty to seventy-five percent of both legislative 
houses. Few checks initially existed, however, on the legislative definition 
of "emergency," so that the potential for annulling the right of appeal 
through the referendum was considerable, particularly in those states in 
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which the courts later decided that the determination of such laws rested 
solely with the legislature.15 
The end product of these varying forms of IR was a highly differen-
tiated pattern of frequency use among the states. Utilization of the IR 
apparently peaked in 1914, when a total of 286 legislative and constitu-
tional proposals confronted the voters nationwide. Among IR states 
referendum proposals ranged in number from four in Ohio to forty-eight 
in California. Oregon in 1914, with her twenty-nine issues, had voted 
upon a total of 114 laws and amendments since 1908. Even Arizona and 
Missouri, with their restrictive forms of IR, sent nineteen and fifteen 
proposals to their voters respectively.16 
It is much easier to acquire aggregate data on IR use than it is on 
IR users; even a list of proposal titles, with certain obvious exceptions, 
offers little clue as to their sponsors. Nevertheless, certain types of use 
and users can be distinguished. Among IR implementers were the initial 
groups active in the enactment of IR. Single-taxers in some instances 
utilized IR, particularly in Oregon. After an open attempt to amend the 
tax structure through the initiative failed in 1908, the Oregon single-
taxers narrowly succeeded in initiating an amendment two years later 
that established county-level determination of the tax base. The election 
was marked with controversy, as opponents charged Henry George's dis-
ciples with deliberately masking their true intent by introducing their 
petition with a clause rescinding the poll tax, already abolished three 
years earlier. Success was short lived, as the amendment was revoked by 
initiative in the succeeding general election. Voters defeated their pro-
posal, also submitted in 1912, for a graduated franchise tax, for an 
exemption of all personal property from taxation, and for limiting 
improvements on real property to county taxation.17 
In neighboring California single-tax efforts through the IR failed 
four times, primarily through organized opposition in the form of the 
Anti-Single Tax League. Colleagues in Missouri were no more success-
ful in 1918, when an initiative to base all state revenue on the taxation 
of unimproved land, liquor, and income and inheritances likewise 
failed.1» 
Organized labor and, to a lesser extent, the Grange also practiced 
what they had earlier advocated. On occasion both groups worked closely 
together. In Washington state, for example, they labored through their 
Joint Legislative Committee, which not only maintained an active lobby 
at Olympia, but also gathered signatures on initiative petitions. In 1913 
they succeeded in getting five of their seven proposals on the ballot, in-
cluding a measure to prohibit the employment agency fee levied against 
workmen utilizing their services. Five years later labor reciprocated 
when the Joint Labor Council initiated a measure to permit towns, 
counties and port districts to operate mills, warehouses and cold storage 
plants, and to allow them to market farm products.19 
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The more common pattern was for both organizations to work sep-
arately. Grange activity was most prominent in Oregon. In 1906 they 
successfully sponsored several measures. Two years later they defeated 
through the referendum a law that would have appropriated $100,000 
for armories. They failed, however, in their attempt to convince voters 
of the need for a state highway department. In Oklahoma an initiated 
petition that created an eleven-member state board of agriculture staffed 
solely by farmers easily gained the necessary majority of votes at the 
1912 general election; and it may have had Grange sponsorship or sup-
port.20 For the most part, Grange IR activity in other states, if any, 
failed to receive much publicity. 
IR appears to have been used more extensively by organized labor 
than by its other initial sponsors. State federations of labor sponsored 
several labor proposals in Colorado (1912) and Washington (1914); in 
Arizona they were successful in initiating seven pro-labor laws in 1912 
and six in 1914, including the prohibition of blacklisting. Union activi-
ties added employers' liability laws to the statute books in Oregon 
(1910), Nebraska and Washington (1914); and repealed the poll tax in 
California (1914). Oklahoma miners invoked the referendum success-
fully against a legislatively-enacted mine law in 1913. Nebraska added 
workmen's compensation by initiative in 1916, although a similar effort 
in Montana failed.21 
Not all labor efforts were successful. California and Washington 
voters in 1914 rejected labor-sponsored initiatives calling for an eight-
hour day for men and women; while Oregon turned down a similar 
measure applied to women only. Californians even refused to endorse 
the principle of one day's rest in seven that year. Labor efforts in Colo-
rado to provide for jury trials in certain contempt of court cases were 
unsuccessful in 1912. Two years later an initiative to codify laws relat-
ing to women and children also failed.22 
Original backers of the IR comprised a minute fraction of those who 
actually implemented the device. A complete listing of IR users, even 
if feasible, would be tedious; but selected examples can shed light on the 
flexibility of IR. At the same time, these illustrations modify IR's image 
as a device extending the political power of the individual while ex-
panding social and democratic opportunities across the board. 
Organizations such as the prohibitionists and the woman suffragists 
frequently resorted to IR. Prohibitionists, especially the Anti-Saloon 
League, had utilized the petition referendum locally long before IR 
was adopted on the state level. The League's usual plan of action was 
to secure enactment of local option law by referendum on the municipal 
or township level; extend the local unit to embrace the county (and 
thus isolate the wet areas); and finally, after a strong prohibitionist base 
had been established, to seek statewide prohibition. By 1920 a rough 
calculation shows that at least twenty-nine proposals restricting alcoholic 
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manufacture or distribution confronted voters in sixteen of the IR 
states; and that at least ten of them adopted statewide prohibition.23 
Woman suffragists were also frequent IR users. An incomplete count 
reveals twenty proposals relating to women voting in ten of the IR 
states before the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment to the federal 
constitution. Oregon finally gave women the suffrage in 1910 on the 
fourth consecutive initiative petition; and three submissions each in 
Michigan and Ohio were necessary for suffragists to achieve success.24 
Moral or cultural issues other than liquor or woman suffrage also 
faced voters by means of IR. There were some generally unsuccessful ef-
forts to abolish the death penalty in Arizona (1914), Ohio and Oregon 
(1912), although Arizona briefly approved it in 1916. Voters endorsed 
various anti-gambling provisions in Oregon (1908), California and Okla-
homa (1914), and Arizona (1918). At the same elections in which they 
were balloting on this issue, voters also approved red-light abatement 
laws in California and Arizona. Boxing came under adverse scrutiny at 
the polls in California and Montana in 1914, and divorce in South 
Dakota (1907) and Arizona (1916).25 
Some found in IR a convenient tool to express their cultural biases 
against a specific group, thus illustrating the undemocratic potential of 
direct democracy. Shortly after achieving statehood, Oklahomans ini-
tiated a "grandfather clause" amendment to their constitution, estab-
lishing an educational requirement for voting, but in effect applying it 
to blacks while exempting similarly low-educated whites. In Arizona 
voters approved an initiated law that required at least 80% of the em-
ployees of any person or company within the state employing more than 
five individuals be American citizens. The California electorate ex-
pressed its nativism in 1920 by initiating additional restrictions to the 
alien land law passed by the legislature in 1913; and by another initia-
tive that placed a four-dollar poll tax upon every alien inhabitant. In 
that same year Michigan voters defeated an attack on private and 
parochial education that would have made attendance of school-age 
children at public schools mandatory.26 
The initiative provided an alternate means for groups to enact what 
was not possible through the normal legislative process; while the refer-
endum afforded a second opportunity to defeat what had been legislated 
over their objections. Owners of a private toll road in Oregon, for 
example, initiated in vain a proposal for the state to purchase their 
financially unsound enterprise. In Maine voters demurred when they 
were called upon to endorse a law passed by the legislature at the behest 
of the leaders of a summer resort community who wished to establish 
a separate town organization free from the control of local farmers. An 
owner of extensive mining interests in Arizona sponsored an initiative 
to separate Miami County from Gila County. In a petition drive marked 
by irregularities and fraud the Ohio Equity Association, composed of 
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some industrial insurance companies, sought to refer a 1913 Ohio law 
providing compulsory workmen's compensation through a state-admin-
istered insurance fund. American Legionaires in Arizona tried in vain 
to initiate a law creating a civil service commission that would give 
preference in their appointments to World War I veterans.27 
Higher education occasionally became an unwilling political pawn 
through IR. In 1908 a referendum was held on a legislative bill, passed 
over the governor's veto, that increased the fixed appropriation for the 
University of Oregon from* $47,500 to $125,000 annually. Finances for 
the university, including faculty salaries, were suspended until loyal 
alumni helped the school receive a narrow vote of confidence at the 
polls. Not only was the university financially crippled for some time, 
but for the next few years the school was required to fight for the reten-
tion of its legislative appropriations in the voting booths.28 
Even political parties in one instance fought out their differences 
through IR. In Ohio the Republican recapture of the legislature in 
1914 resulted in a redistricting pattern that Democrats called a GOP 
gerrymander, and promptly referred the bill to the voters the following 
year. Voters sustained their legislature in a campaign predictably fought 
along partisan lines.29 
Critics of the IR were somewhat more perceptive than its advocates 
in recognizing the process as a two-edged sword—one that was just as 
easily used by the opposition. "Does any experienced observer believe 
that 'machines' which assemble large majorities for candidates at the 
bosses' bidding could not pass and defeat laws in the same manner?" 
inquired one student of the problem. Another observer agreed. "The 
bosses, as well as the people can initiate bills and make recalls," he 
remarked to his readers, "and they are far more shrewd and resourceful 
than the people are in the art of political manipulation."30 
At times the IR process thus became the arena in which opposing 
groups competed for public approval. In Oregon rival interests in sal-
mon fisheries on the Columbia River each submitted a law in 1908 re-
stricting the type of fishing engaged in by the other. The issue involved 
the use of gill-nets as opposed to fish-wheels. Voters approved both 
measures and thus eliminated commercial fishing in the river! The legis-
lature later responded by providing reasonable regulations and establish-
ing closed seasons. Two years later, in 1910, competition within the 
fishing industry again spilled over into the polling booth. The Rogue 
River Fish Protective Association, composed of up-stream fishermen, 
initiated a petition to ban commercial fishing downstream by limiting 
all fishing to angling. Representatives of a large cannery at the mouth of 
the river protested, but in vain.31 
Labor-management conflicts constituted one type of adversary inter-
action that tended to overflow from the legislature into the IR area. 
Oregon provides a case in point. There the Employers' Association vainly 
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attempted to forestall the state Federation of Labor's employers' liability 
initiative in 1910 by initiating a proposal creating an investigative com-
mission. Two years later the employers unsuccessfully sought by initia-
tive to prohibit boycott or picketing; and to restrict public meetings by 
requiring a mayor's permit. In Arizona corporations supported a 1916 
initiated amendment that allegedly would have emasculated labor's 
newly-won workmen's compensation law.32 
The more common labor-management pattern was to work through 
the referendum to inhibit adversary advantage. On occasion labor 
would resort to the referendum, as in the case of Oklahoma, where 
miners revoked a mining law in 1913 that they felt to be disadvantage-
ous. More commonly labor was on the defensive, as they had to ward off 
referenda on hard-fought legislative gains. Railroads challenged full-
crew laws in Arizona (1912) and Missouri (1914); and laws limiting the 
number of cars per train in both Colorado and Arizona in 1912. In that 
same election mine owners in Arizona referred a mine laborers' lien law; 
while those in Colorado two years later unsuccessfully opposed an eight-
hour law in underground mines, smelters and coke ovens. A simul-
taneous management referral of a Colorado law relieving workers of the 
common-law principle of assumption of risk failed; but a referendum on 
a Missouri workmen's compensation law in 1920 succeeded.33 
Liquor antagonists also used the IR as a forum for their often heated 
conflicts. Washington state provides a classic example of the Anti-Saloon 
League's adeptness in utilizing the IR process to perfection. The first 
petition filed under Washington's IR, adopted in 1912, the prohibition 
amendment followed the League's pattern of calling simply for an end 
to the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages. As such it did not 
eliminate its consumption. In the period before the election the League 
divided the state into precincts of about 120 families each, under the 
direction of a League captain and ten canvassers. A League "Flying 
Squadron" arrived in October from out of state, to provide singers, 
speakers, and to organize parades. Wet forces, hampered by divided 
attitudes within organized labor, fought the amendment in vain. Wash-
ington liquor interests responded immediately. Brewers initiated an 
amendment to permit the manufacture and sale of beer by brewer to 
consumer; while the hotel and liquor industries combined to secure 
passage of a bill permitting restricted liquor sales, particularly in hotels. 
Both were inundated at the polls in 1916.34 
Colorado's pattern was somewhat similar. Voters adopted statewide 
prohibition in 1914 on its second submission. By the following election 
an initiative appeared that declared beer to be non-intoxicating, and 
permitted its manufacture and sale. Voter defeat of the measure by a 
two-to-one margin encouraged drys to submit a "bone-dry" prohibition 
law in 1918 successfully.35 
At times competing liquor proposals appeared on the same ballot. 
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The Greater Oregon Home Rule Association sponsored an initiative 
calling for local control of liquor traffic at the same time that drys sub-
mitted a pair of prohibition amendments. Arizona drys, operating as the 
Temperance Federation of Arizona, initiated a prohibition amendment 
in 1914, prompting liquor interests to organize the Arizona Business 
Men's Home Rule League and so submit a local option amendment. 
Voters preferred prohibition. Two years later prohibitionists, operating 
in characteristic fashion, initiated a "bone-dry" amendment. Wets again 
countered with a local option bill, but drys carried the day.36 
The Ohio experience shows the role of IR in the liquor question to 
the fullest extent. In the early twentieth century the Anti-Saloon League 
followed the usual local option route, with each law embracing a larger 
geographic unit. The best the League could do in the Ohio Constitu-
tional Convention in 1912 was to see a liquor license amendment sub-
mitted for ratification. Although its provisions were stringent, wets were 
satisfied with the constitutional recognition of liquor's legality, particu-
larly when the potential alternative was prohibition. 
The League overcame its initial suspicion of IR to initiate a measure 
in 1913 prohibiting liquor shipments into dry territory. Wets countered 
with a proposed amendment to consolidate rural counties into single-
member legislative districts in an effort to reduce prohibitionist strength 
from country areas in the legislature. Neither initiative carried. 
Battle resumed in 1914 with the League sponsoring a prohibition 
amendment. Wets, borrowing a page from dry tactics, submitted an 
amendment to permit towns and cities, not counties, to be the local op-
tion unit. The effect, when voters endorsed the plan, was to make wet 
all counties which had previously voted dry under the county option 
law. The following year prohibition was again rejected. At that same 
election wets proposed to outlaw for six years the resubmission of any 
amendment previously defeated twice. Voters felt this was too obvious 
an abuse of IR ideals and defeated the amendment. Drys suffered a 
further setback in 1915 when a law that decentralized the system of 
liquor licensing was repealed by referendum. Undaunted by previous 
defeats, clrys submitted a third prohibition amendment in 1917; this time 
the margin of defeat was reduced to 1137 votes of a total 1,046,517 cast.37 
The World War I era saw the injection of medical questions into the 
IR process. An initiated proposal in Oregon in 1914 concerned the 
regulation of dentists; while laws providing for the regulation of medical 
practice were referred in Colorado (1916) and Oklahoma (1920). A 
group in Arizona successfully initiated a ban on vaccination in 1918; 
and religious groups in California, operating as the Public School Pro-
tective League, made an identical but unsuccessful effort in 1920.38 
Internal conflict among the healing arts fraternity found its fullest 
expression in California. As early as 1914 one group clearly not asso-
ciated with the American Medical Association sought to legalize their 
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art by initiating a measure to create a state board of drugless practice. 
Six years later voters faced initiatives to establish a separate board of 
chiropractic examiners, and to prohibit vivisection; and a referendum 
on a law regulating the use of narcotic drugs which osteopaths claimed 
discriminated against them. Lumping the anti-vaccination proposal with 
these three, medical and scientific forces conducted a successful campaign 
against what they labeled the "Quack Quartet." The state dental asso-
ciation had had its own problems two years earlier. An operator of a 
chain of dental clinics named "Painless Parker" had sought to ease the 
licensing of dentists coming in from other states, and to require the 
presence of a third person when administering an anesthetic.39 
IR supporters often tried to inhibit opposition tampering by incor-
porating into the IR reform a clause that exempted an initiative proposal 
from legislative amendment or executive veto. There was no meaningful 
way, however, to prevent the enemy from utilizing the initiative or 
referendum to undo what had been enacted. The 1910 single-taxers' 
county option plan in Oregon was repealed two years later. In Cali-
fornia the initiated petition that banned prize fighting was overturned 
ten years later. A referred statute in South Dakota in 1912 repealed a 
law concerning property damages caused by trespassing animals. Ari-
zonans twice changed their minds on the abolition of capital punishment 
within a decade.40 
At least two possibilities existed to limit the effectiveness of the IR 
by one's opponents. One method was the delay technique. California 
wets sought to suspend the enforcement of the prohibition amendment 
should voters ratify it at that same election. A second avenue was to 
restrict the use of the IR, such as Ohio's ban on the use of the IR for the 
single tax or for the classification of property for taxation purposes. Mis-
souri voters turned down a similar anti-single-tax amendment to their 
IR process in 1914.41 
If total restriction were impossible, limiting the frequency of re-
submission was a related possibility. In Colorado an unsuccessful initia-
tive would have required a six-year lapse before it could come up for a 
second referendum vote. Oklahoma's IR included a three-year interval 
in the original proposal, as did Nebraska. California wets sought an 
eight-year hiatus between elections on statewide prohibition. Ohio voters 
were asked to place a six-year limit on resubmitting twice-defeated pro-
posals, aimed primarily at stifling prohibition. When the amendment 
failed, its sponsors revealed their devotion to its principle by announcing 
their intention to resubmit the question at the earliest opportunity.42 
A re-examination of the IR suggests certain observations about its 
role and the milieu in which it functioned. First, it is a common practice 
56 
when treating this period to lump the recall together with the IR as a 
package. Many contemporaries of the early twentieth century saw a 
sharp distinction between the two; and endorsement of IR did not auto-
matically imply acceptance of the recall. The two were officially sep-
arated quite early; the National Direct Legislation Convention, meeting 
at St. Louis in 1896, "by resolution permitted Direct-Legislation and 
Referendum Leagues to attach the recall and proportional representa-
tion to their objects, but expressly stated neither of these was a part of 
Direct Legislation."43 President Taft held up the admission of Arizona 
to the Union in 1911 until the territory deleted the judicial recall pro-
vision, which Taft regarded as a threat to judicial independence. Many 
regarded Theodore Roosevelt's ringing endorsement of the recall of 
state judicial decisions invalidating social and economic legislation in 
1912 as a brave but politically inexpedient act. Analysis of delegate roll 
calls at the Ohio Constitutional Convention (where Roosevelt made his 
endorsement) underscores this split among proponents of direct democ-
racy. Only eight of the IR states, excluding Ohio, adopted the recall by 
1920; and three of these specifically exempted judges.44 
Second, attitudes about IR frequently were less shaped by ideological 
considerations—it extends direct democracy to the people, and thus is 
inherently good or evil—and more by its perceived relationship to other 
issues. The fact that IR was either sponsored or used by single-taxers, 
labor unions, suffragists, and those active in the liquor issue was well-
known; its early advocates freely admitted that IR was a tool useful to 
many. Ohio's Constitutional Convention delegates related IR to single-
tax advocates, and prohibited its use for that purpose. Several Ohio 
delegates saw the IR in terms of rural-urban conflict, and feared that 
rural dominance of the legislature would give way to urban control. 
"The city would have the advantage of the country, since the voters are 
closer together." Another rural delegate foresaw IR petitions being 
drawn up in some back office and placed in the hands of the "great 
Cleveland and Cincinnati Initiative and Referendum Trust Company, 
Limited." "The truth is," he asserted, "it looks very much as though 
there was a conspiracy on the part of the controlling class of large 
cities."45 
Others feared labor would gain an undue advantage through IR. 
One delegate to the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, held in 
1917-18, paraphrased one of the misgivings expressed by IR opponents 
to the effect "that organized labor, with the power it has in this Com-
monwealth, would destroy the government if the I. and R. was adopted. 
. . ,"
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 A pamphlet published by a Roman Catholic organization in Ohio 
viewed the IR as "the advance guard of Socialism. . . . In this is hidden 
the taxation of churches and charitable institutions. It is the instrument 
of denial of the right of education in private schools and colleges. . . ,"47 
Many determined their opinion of IR by its perceived relation to the 
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liquor question. IR opponents in prohibitionist Kansas saw it as a tool 
of the wets—"a populist whiskey measure," one legislator termed it in 
1897. Fourteen years later a Topeka legislator echoed similar sentiments. 
The IR would place "into the hands of the brewers [a method] which 
will enable them to refer the prohibitory law and thereby cause unneces-
sary contention and strife. . . ,"48 
The Anti-Saloon League reflected the ultimate in its pragmatic atti-
tude toward IR. Despite its relatively good success with the IR, the 
League did not hesitate to oppose the measure when its use appeared to 
be disadvantageous. The League, for example, denounced IR in Illinois 
in 1912, fearing that Chicago wets would gain an advantage. In other 
states, particularly in Ohio after 1912, the League used IR extensively. 
"The first and last business of the Anti-Saloon League is to abolish 
saloons," a League official reminded his readers. Thus "the Anti-Saloon 
League has secured and used local option whenever it has been possible 
to make an advance along temperance lines thereby. It has also, how-
ever, consistently opposed the adoption and use of local option where 
such adoption and use meant a backward step in temperance reform."49 
Third, despite proponents' insistence that the IR was a truly "pro-
gressive" reform in giving "the people" a more direct voice in govern-
ment, such characterizations inhibit a precise understanding of the 
device. Neither the reform nor its practitioners can be uniformly con-
sidered as "progressive," however defined. Further, in practice the IR 
proved to be ideally designed for organized group use. For economically-
oriented lobby associations (labor, business) an unrestricted IR per-
mitted them to take advantage both of their organization and of their 
generally urban location, where potential signers were conveniently con-
centrated. For issue-oriented reform groups (prohibitionists, woman 
suffragists) the IR came at a time when both major political parties 
either straddled the issues or ignored them altogether, and when timid 
partisan legislators avoided vexation issues. 
Timing was important for the potential of the IR in another sense. 
One study strongly suggests that voter turnout at the polls (the propor-
tion voting of the total number eligible to vote) diminished significantly 
in the first several decades of the twentieth century.50 Contemporary 
political analysts expressed constant concern about this decline in turn-
out; in fact, the perception of lack of interest at the polls was a frequent 
argument against the IR. The reason is clear: a smaller turnout, com-
bined with the easing of the ratification process to require only a majority 
of those voting on the issue, enhanced tremendously the possibility for 
minority rule. In the hands of well-organized groups the potential for 
their assumption of decision-making was awesome, because under these 
conditions failure to vote amounted to endorsement of the proposal. 
The realization of this potential was hindered only by voter tendency 
to defeat referendum submissions at least as often as to approve them.51 
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The initiative may well have served the added function of fostering 
and maintaining group cohesion. Woman suffragists, for example, suf-
fered from a chronic lack of funds. Brief, biennial legislative sessions 
directly involved only a small fraction of the suffrage organization lobby-
ing for their objectives. The initiative, on the other hand, fulfilled the 
double purpose of providing an energy outlet for all as well as a means 
of overcoming their small finances. The entire membership could donate 
their services in collecting signatures on the petition and, later, in the 
campaign for ratification. Working for woman suffrage through the 
initiative gave the organization a permanent, continuous reason for 
existence, providing a more stable base from which to maintain en-
thusiasm and regular financial support.52 
Fourth, evidence suggests that the IR was usually the avenue of last, 
not first, resort. The normal procedure was to begin action in the legis-
lature, and to use the initiative only if the proposal met with legislative 
obstructions. By the same token, efforts to refer a statute to the elec-
torate would result only from an inability to defeat the measure in the 
legislature. Even under the most favorable of circumstances, securing 
tens of thousands of signatures represented an appreciable investment of 
organizational time and money. Further, it seems probable that the 
process of referring a statute was used more frequently by groups to op-
pose change and to maintain the status quo. Moreover, referred meas-
ures would probably involve disputes between two specific interest 
groups (i.e., employers versus labor) rather than laws whose impact 
would be more general. In any event, both parties would naturally claim 
to represent the "public interest."53 
Finally, use of the IR did not stop with the end of World War I. 
This impression appears to have been fostered in part on the basis of 
contemporary reporting of the IR. For example, references to IR in the 
Reader's Guide show a dramatic drop in the 1920s from the number of 
citations in the immediate pre-World War I period. Similarly, The 
American Political Science Review, which began in 1915 to give an an-
nual summary of IR activity nationwide, dropped the practice in the 
early 1920s. An accurate picture of post-1920 IR usage is further handi-
capped by a fixation on the part of later IR scholars with the questions 
of voter interest in IR as expressed in voter turnout, as well as with the 
liberal or conservative impact of IR upon an individual state. 
Scattered evidence suggests that the amount of usage probably de-
clined; it would be rare to see a ballot of twenty, thirty or forty items 
that confronted Oregon and California voters in 1910-1914. Neverthe-
less, the number of IR proposals appears to have maintained a relatively 
stable pattern in the 1920s and 1930s in such states as Washington, Ari-
zona, and Michigan. California and Oregon continued to operate at a 
lower but fairly stable frequency level. In fact, the Depression period 
seemed to have acted as a small spur to IR activity. 
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Certain issues, of course, disappeared. Federal constitutional amend-
ments settled the questions of woman suffrage and prohibition, except 
for referenda on state repeal in the 1930s. There was little effort after 
1920 to alter the IR framework already established. Still there is a strong 
sense of continuity. Medical issues made an occasional appearance. 
Taxation matters continued to perplex voters; after 1920 they tended to 
involve the levying and apportionment of income, sales and fuel taxes. 
Attempts to close the Rogue River to commercial fishing in Oregon con-
tinued at least through 1930. In the 1930s questions of exemptions and 
of tax and spending lids appeared. Sportsmen, labor, business—all con-
tinued to resort to the IR as political expediency demanded.54 
The IR, then, appears as an adaptation to shifts in the political and 
economic sectors induced by industrial and urban growth. The emer-
gence of large-scale units of production and distribution challenged a 
political system based upon small geographical units designed at least in 
part to preserve local autonomy. Pressures for uniformity resulting from 
corporate needs precipitated centralized decision-making. One adapta-
tion, the rise of statewide interest groups, coincided with the gradual 
integration of political party structures. As a result, state legislatures 
became less responsive to local community interests and more receptive 
to lobbying efforts representing certain geographically broad segments 
of the business community. In urban areas corporations sought to 
solidify their position by such "reforms" as reducing the size of the legis-
lative unit, often combined with an at-large election system; and by 
imposing upon local government an administrative structure—the city-
manager form—that closely simulated the corporate model.55 
Those who found themselves outside of political decision-making 
sought other adjustments that would allow them access. Where the ob-
stacle was perceived to be an unholy corporate-political party alliance, 
the thrust often took the form of the nonpartisan ballot. In other in-
stances the IR was seen as a possible ameliorative device. In both cases 
the aim was to circumvent the political "ins," whether they be execu-
tives, legislators, or judges, who thwarted the aims of a particular group. 
The key focus here is on the word "group." Despite the rhetorical focus 
upon expansion of individual power, nearly all such political adjust-
ments presupposed organized implementation, thus reflecting the in-
creasingly collectivist nature of society. 
The IR accentuated traditional lines of cleavage: management-labor, 
wet-dry, and rural-urban. At times it even revealed intra-group divisions. 
Yet no sector of society monopolized its use. Corporations, initially re-
sistant to IR, soon found it to be potentially useful under certain ad-
versarial conditions. Urban and labor interests saw in IR a way to cir-
cumvent a rural-oriented legislature whose refusal to recognize state 
population shifts resulted in a malapportionment increasingly favorable 
to agrarian power.56 Nevertheless, rural society could not only blunt the 
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potential urban thrust by incorporating restrictions as to IR use; but 
it also was able to utilize the IR to impose its own cultural values upon 
the city. The device thus subjected both city and country to loss of 
autonomy. 
Although the IR did not disappear from use in the 1920s, the re-
duced level of implementation provides a striking contrast to the aspira-
tions of its early supporters. Several factors might have contributed to 
this decline. In the first place, IR was at best a complement to the legis-
lature, not a substitute for it. Thus the legislature remained the body 
of first instance; and the IR became a safety-valve in case of legislative 
failure. Secondly, except for scattered volatile issues such as liquor and 
woman suffrage (both resolved by 1920) the IR did nothing to stem 
increased voter apathy beginning with 1900 and continuing into the 
Depression. Ballots often couched in technical language failed to in-
terest voters. Contrary to the hopes of Progressive reformers and muck-
rakers, an informed electorate is not always a viable one. Thirdly, the 
very two-edged nature of the IR, usable by enemy as well as friend to 
undo what had been done, failed to foster stability in an increasingly 
unstable society. If recent historians are correct in seeing twentieth-
century American society and its corporate components as searching for 
order and predictability,57 the IR's flexible usage provided no haven 
from uncertainty. In fact, corporate adeptness at working within the 
formal political structure may well have made the legislature remain 
the more reliable instrument of goal-attainment. 
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